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Abstract
Since 1995 Australian health insurers have been able to purchase health services pro-actively
through negotiating contracts with hospitals, but little is known about their experience of
purchasing. This paper examines the current status of purchasing through interviews with senior
managers representing all Australian private health insurers. Many of the traditional tools used to
generate competition and enhance efficiency (such as selective contracting and co-payments) have
had limited use due to public and political opposition. Adoption of bundled case payment models
using diagnosis related groups (DRGs) has been slow. Insurers cite multiple reasons including poor
understanding of private hospital costs, unfamiliarity with DRGs, resistance from the medical
profession and concerns about premature discharge. Innovation in payment models has been
limited, although some insurers are considering introduction of volume-outcome purchasing and
pay for performance incentives. Private health insurers also face a complex web of regulation, some
of which appears to impede moves towards more efficient purchasing.
Background
The last decade has witnessed a revolution in payment
arrangements for public hospitals in Australia. Victoria
was the first state to introduce casemix using diagnosis
related groups (DRGs) as the basis of paying for inpatient
care in public hospitals in 1993. Within 3 years, all other
states except New South Wales had followed suit [1]. The
widespread adoption of DRGs to replace historical budg-
ets resulted in measurable gains in productivity as public
hospitals became accountable for delivery of specified
outputs [2]. DRGs group together patients with similar
expected resource utilization, shifting the incentive from
purchasers to health providers to manage the components
of care more efficiently.
Contemporaneously, the Commonwealth Government
legislated in 1995 to enable contracting between insurers,
hospitals and doctors, arising from concerns about declin-
ing private health insurance membership fuelled by con-
sumer dissatisfaction at insurance co-payments [3,4].
Commonwealth regulation of contracting arrangements
under the National Health Act 1953 requires that contracts
between hospitals and insurers be described on the basis
of casemix episodic payments using Australian National
DRGs (AN-DRGs). However insurers and hospitals have
flexibility as to the actual structure of the payment mech-
anism used in such contracts.
In introducing the 1995 contracting reforms, the Com-
monwealth Minister proposed that one of the central
objectives was to transform private health insurers from
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"passive bill payers" into active purchasers of services for
their members [5]. Health purchasing has been defined as
"buying the best value for money services to achieve the
maximum health gain for those most in need" [6]. How-
ever this definition is from a study of the experience of the
British National Health Service and the reference to peo-
ple 'most in need' may be less relevant to the role of pri-
vate sector purchasers. In a review of major health service
purchasers in the United States, 'value purchasing' was
defined as "an organized attempt by a private- or public-
sector purchaser to ensure quality and to improve health
outcomes, as well as negotiating prices, as an explicit part
of its health care buying strategy" [7]. The simpler version
of this definition was that value purchasing involved "get-
ting the best care for the best price".
Australian private health insurance provides access to doc-
tor of choice and private hospitals, together with covering
ancillary services such as physiotherapy and dental care.
In turn, the public Medicare program provides free access
to public hospitals and subsidized access to medical serv-
ices and pharmaceuticals. The issue of whether private
health insurance duplicates or supplements Medicare has
been considered in several major reviews, including by the
Industry Commission and the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development [8,9]. The lack of consen-
sus on the desired role of private health insurance in the
context of a universal public insurance program compli-
cates the design of the appropriate regulatory framework
for private health insurance.
Private health insurance is tightly regulated by the federal
government under the National Health Act 1973, although
the legislation itself lacks a set of clear policy objectives to
provide a coherent rationale for regulation [9]. The pur-
chasing role of health insurers is significantly shaped and
potentially constrained by regulatory requirements
including:
• Clinical autonomy – health insurance contracts are
required to maintain the medical practitioner's profes-
sional freedom within the scope of accepted clinical
practice;
• Contracting flexibility – health insurers are prohibited
from refusing to contract with hospitals on the basis of the
number of hospital beds, the range of hospital treatments
or the hospital ownership arrangements;
• Benefit mandates – all health insurance products must
provide coverage for palliative care, psychiatric services
and rehabilitation;
• Second tier default benefits – health insurers are
required to pay benefits equal to 85% of average con-
tracted benefits to private hospitals with which they do
not contract; and
• Reinsurance – the costs of high service users and the eld-
erly are redistributed and equalized across all health
insurers.
While the first three of these requirements directly limit
the scope of acceptable contracting by health insurers, the
default benefits and reinsurance arrangements are gener-
ally perceived to be equally, if not more, significant in
influencing purchasing behavior. Interestingly, the legisla-
tion is silent on 'positive' criteria for purchasing and does
not stipulate use of methods such as cost-effectiveness, or
require insurers to consider factors such as quality, clinical
outcomes, value-for-money or efficiency, in entering con-
tracts with hospitals and medical professionals.
At the macro-regulation level, two other factors influence
the purchasing environment of private health insurers.
The 1999 introduction of a 30% tax rebate for private
health insurance creates a clear interest by the Common-
wealth Government in whether health insurers are pur-
chasing services efficiently. However, recent boosts in
membership following the introduction of lifetime com-
munity rating create a countervailing pressure to maintain
the value proposition of private health insurance through
unrestricted choice and access to private services.
The evolution of purchasing among Australian health
insurers subsequent to the 1995 legislation has received
no direct consideration in the academic literature. Since
1999 the Australian Competition and Consumer Com-
mission (ACCC) has produced regular reports that exam-
ine contracting by health insurers to assess the extent of
any anti-competitive practices by either health insurers or
health providers which may have a detrimental effect on
consumers [10]. While these reports constitute a rich
resource of the views of stakeholders on contracting, they
do not directly examine how health insurers are attempt-
ing to meet the purchasing challenge of 'getting the best
care for the best price'. Industry conferences, together with
trade publications, provide some partial and tantalising
glimpses of the evolving purchasing behavior of health
insurers, but again do not provide a comprehensive
picture.
Accordingly, a study was designed to address this gap in
our knowledge of whether Australian health insurers are
buying best value health care for their members. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with key decision-
makers across all Australian private health insurers to
elicit their views on the evolution of purchasing across the
dimensions of quality and coverage of new technology
('best care') and payment models ('best price'). This paperAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:6 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/6
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reports the findings relating to payment models. A future
paper will provide full details of the study methodology,
together with reporting the 'best care' findings on quality
and coverage.
Results
Health insurers were initially asked to describe their cur-
rent payment models including the perceived benefits and
risks of different models, and how their approach to pay-
ment policy had changed over time. This led to more
expanded discussions on the challenges associated with
purchasing private health services including the regula-
tory framework for health insurance, relationships with
private hospitals and issues with contracting. The findings
from these interviews are presented under three main
themes.
First, the purchasing environment is examined from the
perspective of insurers, including their views on options
for contracting, supplier-induced demand, gap payments,
the impact of regulation on contract negotiations, and
their relationships with private hospitals. The second sec-
tion describes the current status of payment models across
the industry including issues and barriers. Finally, the
third section identifies examples of innovation in pur-
chasing by private health insurers with a view to highlight-
ing potential future developments in payment models.
Purchasing environment
Selective contracting
Health insurers were acutely conscious that government
policy changes to encourage higher levels of health insur-
ance membership had a direct influence on public percep-
tions about the value of insurance, and hence impacted
on their ability to exercise greater purchasing discipline. A
critical dimension of pro-active purchasing of health serv-
ices involves the ability to select providers on the basis of
criteria such as quality and efficiency in service delivery.
However, this implies some restriction in choice of service
providers for members, a difficult message as noted by
one insurer:
"Funds tend to have a philosophy of wanting to offer a wide a
choice as possible, and at this point in time, after the initiatives
of lifetime health cover and all that entails, and the 30%
rebate, this is not a good time to be selectively contracting,
because it means that you may restrict access."
In addition to anticipated consumer resistance, some
insurers believed that previous selective tendering proc-
esses by other insurers had generated "a lot of angst" and
"mistrust" among private hospitals. One insurer noted
that the concept of selective contracting was almost a
"taboo" topic. Moreover, insurers argued that government
regulation, requiring insurers to pay a second-tier default
benefit to hospitals that did not win contracts (equal to
85% of contracted benefit payment), undermined their
negotiation ability and resulted in "propping up" private
hospitals.
"So second tier and portability are going to make the competi-
tive tension very difficult in the industry, very difficult....It
needs some sort of competitive tension to, if you wish to direct
your business or have some sort of preferential arrangements."
Insurers also noted that the potential for some "iconic
hospitals" to not gain contracts had major public and
political risks as these disenfranchised hospitals used the
media to argue against the merits of contracting decisions
by insurers. Despite general reservations about the diffi-
culty in refusing to contract with certain hospitals, two
insurers gave examples of situations where they had con-
fronted proprietors planning to open new facilities to
inform them that they would not receive insurance bene-
fits. One case was based on the insurer's view that there
was an adequate supply of psychiatric services in a geo-
graphic region, while the other case related to concerns
about establishing a cardiac catheterisation laboratory in
a small hospital with no immediate access to supporting
intensive care or coronary care units. It appeared in both
cases that this pre-emptive positioning by insurers had
halted further development, although private hospitals
could have simply ignored this threat, established the
services and proceeded to claim second tier default
benefits.
Supplier-induced demand
One of the reasons why insurers expressed concern about
not being able to exercise greater purchasing power
through selective contracting was because they believed
that providers could often generate demand for unneces-
sary health care services. This view was expressed most
succinctly by one insurer:
"Access equals demand. You open it and it'll be full and it'll be
new demand."
However another insurer challenged this view, citing the
spare capacity in many private hospitals and examples of
private hospitals that had experienced financial difficulty
due to low occupancy. Most insurers expressed reserva-
tions about the lack of government planning or quality
controls for new hospitals, singling out the growth in day
procedure facilities that they suggested were "jumping up
everywhere".
The lack of success by insurers in having medical services
included in their contracts with private hospitals (the
'practitioner agreements' provisions in the 1995 legisla-
tive amendments) has also stymied their ability toAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:6 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/6
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influence service provision levels. Insurers noted the
potential for over-servicing, with one respondent arguing
that loose arrangements between private hospitals and
doctors, together with the lack of a "strong teaching envi-
ronment" created the preconditions in which inappropri-
ate or unnecessary care could be provided. Insurers noted
that entrepreneurial claiming behavior by some health
providers required constant vigilance in benefits
management.
"The incentives that exist to generate income are quite strong
and as a result, you get some pretty poor behavior, sometimes
fraudulent, but certainly creative as to how you would generate
income as an individual... So we have a whole industry now of
what we call benefits limitation, benefits management."
Consumer co-payments
Since 2000, government regulation has required that pri-
vate health insurance for medical services related to a hos-
pital admission be provided on either a 'no gap' or
'known gap' basis [11]. While there is no similar legisla-
tive requirement on hospital costs, interviews confirmed
that the widespread industry practice was that hospital
contracts were negotiated to minimize consumer co-pay-
ments. As with selective contracting, this was justified on
the basis that co-payments would "water down the value
proposition" of private health insurance. Only one major
insurer had a policy of explicitly using hospital co-pay-
ments to "promote competition" and to "send a message
to consumers" to reassess the medical necessity of their
use of hospital services.
Generally, insurers noted that even members who had
chosen to purchase cheaper insurance products, with
front-end deductibles or specified hospital co-payments,
often became upset when faced with having to meet these
costs themselves on admission to hospital.
Perceptions of public aversion to insurance co-payments
meant that most insurers were reluctant to establish a sys-
tem of tiered hospitals, that might encourage members to
use preferred hospitals with zero co-payments compared
to other hospitals with higher co-payments. Insurers
argued that their members would view this as discrimina-
tory and that the complexity of such a payment system
would make health insurance more confusing. While
some insurers distinguished between 'participating' and
'non-participating' hospitals, this tended to be related to
insurers largely contracting with hospitals in the service
area of their members.
Impact of regulation on purchasing ability
Insurers often referred to the complex web of Common-
wealth Government regulation of their industry and its
impact on their purchasing behavior.
"Purchasing is certainly not easy with any sector. It's never
quite black and white; there's a whole range of other issues than
price. So it's not like you're going out and buying a simple can
of baked beans. But it's certainly made a whole lot more diffi-
cult when you've got legislation that actually prevents you from
doing a good job of purchasing."
The most frequently cited examples of problems with reg-
ulation related to second tier default benefits, reinsurance,
outreach services and prostheses. Of these, the regulation
of outreach services provides a useful illustration of the
difficulty in reconciling conflicting policy objectives. Gov-
ernment regulation has established a reinsurance pool
that redistributes the costs of particular groups across all
insurers, in order to support the principle of community
rating and ensure that insurers with higher claiming mem-
bers do not face a spiralling cycle of adverse selection.
However the reinsurance arrangements only apply to serv-
ices provided under hospital insurance products, not
ancillary products, meaning that services not directly asso-
ciated with a hospital admission are not eligible for inclu-
sion in the reinsurance pool. To overcome the
consequential disincentive to provide effective substitutes
to hospital-based care, the Commonwealth Government
enacted further regulation establishing a tightly pre-
scribed framework under which outreach services could
be provided.
However insurers were critical of the resulting approval
process needed for outreach services, noting:
"And it just seemed to be completely an aberration of going back
to, God knows how many decades ago, where getting out of the
hospital walls, you've got to have this huge bureaucratic process
just to get a home-based care program, which has been running
maybe in the public system for years."
Another problem raised by insurers was that the outreach
legislation only recognizes outreach programs that are
provided by hospitals, whereas insurers may want to pur-
chase these services directly from community-based
providers.
Relationships with the private hospital sector
Insurers often commented on the mutually dependent
relationship they had with private hospitals, arguing that
they were "working for the common cause". One insurer
linked the financial viability of private hospitals and
health insurers as follows:
"Value for money in a health fund product is important, so if
you have an argument with a hospital that says: you get more
business if we have more customers, if you charge us too much
more, then we can't keep our customers. So we can actually
improve your profitability and keep you full, but only if we don'tAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:6 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/6
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get gouged. So make profit off volume, by all means, but don't
make profit off individual patients, because the number of
patients off who you'll be able to make a profit will diminish
rapidly over a short period of time. So we have to live symbiot-
ically here."
The importance of building mature relationships with pri-
vate hospitals was also raised. It was argued that this
required insurers to have "credibility" and be viewed by
private hospitals as "member and patient focussed, not
just money focussed". Credibility included having the
strength of being principled, that is, "we actually do as we
say we'll do", but also being open to discussion with pri-
vate hospitals. In turn, insurers noted that they were more
prepared to consider funding new service models if they
had "faith" in particular private hospitals and there was
"goodwill on both sides".
One insurer stressed that contracting was only part of their
relationship with private hospitals, which needed to be
maintained over time irrespective of whether they were in
or out of contract with individual hospitals. Another
insurer lamented the focus on "perpetual contract negoti-
ation" as detrimental to the ability to build strong rela-
tionships, arguing that it would be preferable to move to
long term contracts. Most insurers spoke of annual con-
tract negotiations with providers, linked to the inability to
accurately estimate future cost growth.
Current status of payment models
Payment models can be classified along a continuum
according to the unit of reimbursement [12]. Figure 1
illustrates that purchasers face greater financial risk with
relatively unbundled payment models, such as fee-for-
service or daily payments as providers have an incentive to
increase the level of outputs. In contrast, financial risk is
transferred away from purchasers to providers through
payment models such as capitation models (where the
unit of reimbursement is the patient) and case payments
or episodic models. (see figure 1)
Interviews revealed that there is currently considerable
variation across private health insurers as to the payment
models used as the basis of hospital contracts. Figure 1
also illustrates the two 'typical' payment models used by
health insurers for most hospital services.
Payment models for hospital services Figure 1
Payment models for hospital services. 
1a) Continuum of reimbursement models (Derived from Jegers et al. [11])
More financial risk for purchaser → → → →→ → → →→ → → →→ → → →→ → → →→ → → →→ → → →→ → → →→ → → →→ → → →→ → → →→ → → →→ → → →→ → → →Less financial risk for purchaser
1b) 'Typical' payment models used by Australian health insurers
Traditional model→→→→→→→→Bundled DRG case payment model
Daily accommodation
Intensive care, coronary care
Item of service Per diem Case Patient Period of time
Prostheses
Theatre
Pharmaceuticals
Bundled DRG payment including
accommodation, theatre, intensive
care, pharmaceuticals
ProsthesesAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:6 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/6
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Most insurers still rely strongly on a 'traditional' payment
model that involves separate payments for each of the
components of hospital care including accommodation,
theatre, prostheses, pharmaceuticals and intensive care
unit (ICU) costs. Insurers usually refer to this as a per
diem payment model. It is based on classifying patients
according to the type of medical service provided using
Medicare Benefit Schedule (MBS) items, with payment
step-downs to encourage shorter lengths of stay. When
viewed against the payment model continuum, it can be
seen that this traditional model is actually more similar to
an item of service payment model than a true per diem
model.
The second typical payment model is the 'bundled DRG
case' payment model where most hospital admission
costs are bundled into a single payment. Currently only
two major insurers (representing about one-quarter of the
insurance market) are using an almost fully bundled DRG
model (with bundling of theatre but separate payments
for prostheses) for the majority of their acute episodes.
Two other major insurers (representing about one-half of
the market) had undertaken substantial developmental
work and were planning significant expansion in their use
of DRGs. However, one crucial difference in the use of
DRGs between the private and public sectors is that med-
ical costs are specifically excluded in the private sector,
with DRGs only applying to non-medical services.
Within these two 'typical' payment models, there is scope
for numerous permutations. For example, some insurers
relying largely on per diem payments still operate a more
bundled case payment model for a limited number of
conditions with relatively predictable costs, such as
obstetrics, dialysis and endoscopy. One insurer referred to
bundling in the cost of low cost prostheses in a predomi-
nantly per diem payment model. Of the two insurers
using a bundled DRG case payment model, one bundled
in ICU costs.
Attitudes and barriers to adoption of DRGs
Insurers, irrespective of their payment model, commented
on some of the advantages of using DRGs relative to the
predominant per diem model including:
• "DRGs are the only thing that is statistically coherent
and recognizes all elements of care and you really can't say
'we're different'."
• "And there's considerable scope, we believe, something
like a 30% scope for reduction of length of stay in the pri-
vate sector."
• "The hospital has an opportunity to do more, to inno-
vate and to make things more cost-effective, in the way
they can and they gain by that. And we gain by a greater
predictability."
• "I think it's crazy when you benchmark by DRG and
then pay by per diem. I think there has to be consistency
between your benchmarking and your payment model."
• "So our aim was to try and get the hospitals onboard, to
try and share the risk, that's our big basis behind our case
payment, share the risk."
The relatively slow progress in uptake of DRGs relative to
the public sector was attributed to a wide range of factors
including limited data and poor understanding of the cost
structures of private hospitals, the lack of familiarity and
understanding of DRG based payment models, resistance
from the medical profession, and concerns about poten-
tially premature discharge.
Of these, the lack of good costing systems was most fre-
quently mentioned, with insurers noting that "the indus-
try is very much historically based". Accordingly, some
insurers referred to using "price weights" based on histor-
ical prices, rather than cost weights. Most insurers were
keen to get greater access to private hospital cost data.
However a dissenting view was offered by one insurer who
cautioned that "the more you get involved in their cost
structure, the more you become a funder". This insurer
was hesitant about moving from a purchasing role to a sit-
uation where insurers might be regarded as being respon-
sible for the financial sustainability of contracted private
hospitals. Insurers also suggested that some private hospi-
tals did not have the capacity to assess properly how effi-
ciency gains flowing from the use of DRGs could
positively impact on their operating margins.
"And what we've been trying to do is get the facilities to look at
their margins, rather than their revenue. Their pure revenue
increases. And not many of them are at that level of sophistica-
tion. Because we believe and can show some of them that if they
do things differently, they can actually get a greater margin,
rather than just increases in pure revenue. But they don't think
like that, many of them."
Insurers reported that providers sometimes equated the
use of DRGs with insurers taking on an undesirable 'man-
aged care' role.
"So even to bring in a casemix funding system which is already
out there, and has already been in the public system for years,
we got pushback from the AMA saying: 'that's managed care',
because it was imposing a length of stay through the inlier type
separation. And those sorts of barriers are just so alive and well
because of the nature of the power that the doctor has in the pri-
vate sector."Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:6 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/6
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The medical profession has long resisted entering con-
tracts with health insurers [11] and this insurer's com-
ments highlight the power of doctors to influence other
payment arrangements between insurers and hospitals.
From the perspective of insurers, the exclusion of medical
costs from DRGs in the private sector is likely to reduce
the potential efficiency gains and may partially explain
the slower adoption of DRGs in the private sector.
Insurers who had introduced DRGs considered that they
had done so in a cost neutral manner, without clawing
back the ensuing efficiency savings made by private hospi-
tals. This was motivated partially by concerns about
avoiding the 'quicker and sicker' phenomenon, often
associated with the use of DRGs.
Several insurers noted that there was now considerable
interest, and indeed pressure, from many private hospitals
for the more uniform adoption of DRGs across private
health insurers.
"I think they want homogeneity. If you look from a provider's
perspective.... the thing that you hate the most is that each fund
has a different methodology about how you submit your claims
and how you get paid... So their perspective is, if it standardizes
along the lines of a casemix type structure, I think their view,
and the Australian Private Hospitals' Association view, is that
that would be a good thing. If they can achieve some back office
efficiencies, then that would help them in the management of
their business and it would also assist them into getting into e-
claiming. That's where they want to get into. It has huge effi-
ciencies for them, and for us, but that needs, largely, a similar
contracting, purchasing base."
Innovation in purchasing by health insurers
Bundled DRG case payments are one mechanism by
which purchasers can encourage providers to seek new
approaches to delivering care more effectively, through
transferring risk to providers. However, Figure 1 shows
that there is potential beyond case payments to encourage
greater allocative efficiency through paying providers on
the basis of capitation or episodic payments.
Insurers who have experience of using DRGs are more
likely to become aware of some of the limitations of DRG
case payments. These include ensuring that providers take
responsibility for pre-admission and post-discharge serv-
ices, or the fact that DRG case payments still contain
inherent incentives for the production of unnecessary
hospital admissions. In response, these insurers might
move towards greater innovation in purchasing by trial-
ling payment models that require providers to assume
financial responsibility for an expanded scope of care.
In fact, interviews for this study found that most innova-
tion in purchasing was concentrated in one of the two
major insurers that had already implemented a bundled
DRG case payment model. Table 1 provides an outline of
four examples of innovative purchasing developed by this
insurer. Two of these examples, episodic management
units and the members extended care arrangements,
involve the provider assuming greater responsibility for
services over an extended period of time relative to the
narrow DRG case definition. The capitation model
involves the psychiatric services provider receiving a fixed
payment for each insured member, irrespective of the
actual services provided. (see Additional file 1)
While all these innovative purchasing models originated
with one insurer, several other insurers had followed its
lead in adopting the same capitation model for psychiat-
ric services in one state. At interview, the second major
insurer using a bundled DRG case payment model did not
outline similar payment models focussed on transferring
risk, but instead emphasized the importance of clear spec-
ification of required quality parameters in hospital
contracts.
Insurers were also asked about their views on innovative
payment models that explicitly link purchasing to quality.
This might include pay for performance frameworks, or
only purchasing services if hospitals undertook at least the
minimum volume recommended to enhance safe patient
outcomes.
Volume-outcome purchasing
Several insurers had undertaken exploratory work on the
potential introduction of 'volume-outcome' purchasing.
In particular, one insurer was cautiously beginning to
apply this framework in purchasing cardiac, neurosurgery
and obstetric services. As one insurer noted:
"If you've got good volume, you don't necessarily have good
quality, but if you've got a small volume, you're really asking for
trouble....We're moving to the view, we're saying that if you
haven't got enough cases to meet industry norms of what's a
critical minimum volume, then we're not going to pay you. We
want you to get out of this business. Now that's stepping on toes,
it's not very popular."
Insurers recognized that volume-outcome purchasing
may be perceived as a threat to the professional autonomy
of individual clinicians. One insurer noted that some
medical colleges or professional associations appeared to
be reluctant to specify recommended minimum volumes,
while another suggested that "the challenge is actually
who will be the arbiter of just what that volume will be".
Another insurer suggested that volume-outcome purchas-
ing might lead to a 'bidding war' between privateAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:6 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/6
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hospitals to poach high profile clinicians and establish
centers of excellence, as follows:
"So what you've got is the hospital operators working very much
with the doctors, trying to keep them happy. So all of a sudden,
gee, I'd actually like to have lobster on Friday in future. You
laugh, but it actually does happen. Some doctors insist on what
they're going to have provided to them for lunch while they're
on their days there. And if they don't get it, no qualms about
packing up and going to the next hospital. They'll take their
patients with them."
Another more practical barrier to implementing volume-
outcome purchasing is that data on the volume of proce-
dures done at individual private hospitals is never pub-
licly released by government, as this information is
considered commercially sensitive. Insurers can only
access such data if private hospitals voluntarily agree to
provide it during contract negotiations. However, insurers
noted that measurement of volume was complicated by
several factors including the fact that specialists may oper-
ate at several hospitals and that some of the literature also
stressed the importance of teams, not just individual clini-
cians, in achieving better outcomes. The impact of vol-
ume-outcome purchasing on centralizing services, with
reduced geographic access in more rural locations, was
also mentioned as a concern.
Finally, the potentially negative impacts on both reducing
consumer choice and increasing member confusion were
highlighted by this insurer.
"For instance, we've talked about what would it look like if we
recommended a particular facility, you know, for maternity and
another for orthopaedics. Very hard to explain to members. We
think we could do that, but members still really see us and it's
our responsibility is to see that we are credible as a health fund.
And they essentially see us as a payer of claims, and interfering
with their choice? There are ways you can structure your prod-
ucts and things differently, but again the product becomes
much more difficult to communicate. And one of the great crit-
icisms of the industry, and it is, is that it's complex. It is difficult
to explain to members their products and the relationships with
providers anyway."
Pay for performance
There was growing interest in the use of pay for perform-
ance models. One insurer was about to commence con-
tract negotiations using a pay for performance model that
linked payment levels to the achievement of quality
standards. Several other insurers expressed interest in tri-
alling pay for performance models in the near future. A
perceived benefit was the potential of pay for performance
models to promote the early adoption of practice changes
such as sentinel events reporting or computerised order-
entry systems for pharmaceuticals.
"Some of the things we might consider is, whether using it a bit
like the Leapfrog Group, whether you can use a pay for perform-
ance approach in a sense to encourage early adoption of stand-
ards....We may look at some rewards upfront, and perhaps
scaling the rewards, as it is with Leapfrog, so it's a loading of
say 4% in year 1 and 2% in year 2, and sorry, it's going to
become standard practice by year 3. So if you get your act
together earlier, you're actually going to benefit from that."
While insurers were generally positive about the value of
using financial incentives "to pursue good practice", they
acknowledged that, as with volume-outcome purchasing,
there was likely to be professional resistance. Moreover, it
was suggested that this might result in regulatory interven-
tion, with the government setting boundaries on what was
considered to be acceptable purchasing behaviour by
health insurers.
Discussion
Progress towards adoption of DRGs in the private sector
Even prior to the 1995 legislation enabling insurers to
contract with private hospitals, there had been considera-
ble effort invested in investigating the potential adoption
of DRGs. Further to the establishment of its Casemix
Development Program, the Commonwealth Government
commissioned a comprehensive 1990 report that identi-
fied options for introducing DRGs in both public and pri-
vate hospitals [13]. However, in 1991 the Australian
Private Hospitals Association urged in relation to intro-
ducing DRGs, that the private sector should "slow down
the indecent haste towards radical change to allow us to
get it right the first time and avoid chaos" [14]. In 1994
private insurers, private hospitals and Commonwealth
Government officials jointly developed the so-called
'Gold Book', essentially an agreed implementation guide
for how casemix using AN-DRGs should be introduced
into the private sector [15].
Using the Gold Book blueprint, BUPA Australia (or
National Mutual Health Insurance as it was at that time)
was the first private health insurer to implement an epi-
sodic case payment approach using AN-DRGs in Victoria
in 1997 and South Australia in 1998. Interestingly, these
two states were also the first states to adopt DRGs in the
public sector. This may have facilitated uptake of case pay-
ments in private hospitals in these states, due to the
familiarity of clinicians working in both public and pri-
vate hospitals. Speaking at the eleventh annual casemix
conference in 1999, a BUPA Australia representative indi-
cated that the changeover process from a per diem to a
DRG case payment had only been achieved by virtue of
BUPA Australia mandating DRG payments in its selectiveAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:6 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/6
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tendering process for private hospital services [15]. Simi-
larly, by 2000 MBF was able to publicly report that its
competitive tendering process in Queensland had
resulted in a major expansion in its use of DRGs for
Queensland private hospitals [16].
This study has found that in 2004 these two companies
are still the only insurers to use DRGs as the basis of pur-
chasing most of their acute hospital services. Hence the
question arises as to why the other insurers have not yet
implemented DRGs, given both the 10–15 year history of
developmental work and the apparent success of two
leading insurers in paving the way in the private sector.
The answer seems to be complex and multi-factorial, with
the reasons for slow progress varying between insurers.
On the surface, the non-DRG insurers most commonly
attributed the problem to concerns about the quality of
private hospital cost data, claiming that the industry was
historically based and that neither insurers nor private
hospitals had access to adequate costing data. However,
given that MBF and BUPA Australia were apparently able
to overcome these problems between four to seven years
ago, it is not obvious that this argument provides suffi-
cient explanatory power. In fact, the leadership by two
companies in implementing DRGs should have resulted
in substantial improvement in private hospital costing
data, noting that BUPA Australia and MBF have significant
market shares between them in Victoria, South Australia,
Queensland and New South Wales [17]. The advocacy by
some private hospitals for greater uniformity in uptake of
DRGs suggests that these private hospitals have confi-
dence in their costing systems and their ability to manage
in a DRG funding environment. For some of the non-
DRG insurers, there seemed to be a 'chicken and egg'
problem with their lack of confidence in private hospital
cost data related to their lack of internal experience in
working with and analysing DRG data. In contrast, BUPA
Australia [15,18,19] and MBF [16,20-22] have regularly
documented at annual casemix conferences their signifi-
cant investment in casemix development.
In 1998 the Australian Health Insurance Association,
argued in relation to private sector uptake of DRGs, that
there was a "culture of inertia" with both health system
providers and funders being "relatively conservative by
nature" [23]. This explanation continued to ring true in
2004 for many (but not all) of the non-DRG insurers
based on interviews for this study. The culture of these
insurers appeared to be inherently conservative and risk
averse, as reflected in their general approach to purchas-
ing. For example, several insurers spoke of the challenges
in getting support from their Boards for major changes to
their purchasing frameworks. Some of these non-DRG
insurers also seemed to be less confident of their ability to
use their market power in driving payment model
reforms, often referring to the countervailing power of
both private hospitals and medical professionals.
In relation to market power, it is of interest to note that
both BUPA Australia and MBF introduced DRGs in the
context of competitive tendering processes. Selective con-
tracting represents a major shift in the power dynamics
between insurers and private hospitals, unleashing the
power of insurers to be purchasers rather than 'passive
bill-payers'. One insurer was clearly uncomfortable with
this use of market power, commenting that the BUPA Aus-
tralia and MBF tenders had generated "a lot of angst and a
lot of dislike". However, another insurer welcomed their
role in pioneering change across the industry, noting that
BUPA Australia was well-regarded for its commercial
adeptness and MBF was viewed as a strong leader in pur-
chasing for quality.
Role of current payment models in 'buying best value 
health care'
Based on the continuum of payment systems featured in
Figure 1, the assumption behind this study is that greater
use of DRGs would enable health insurers to be more
effective in 'buying best value health care'. From a techni-
cal efficiency perspective, the advantages of DRG case pay-
ments over charging fees for individual items or per diem
rates are well accepted. For example, the OECD in its most
recent review of high-performing health systems has
argued that prospective, case-related payment systems
offer significant benefits in inducing hospitals to seek pro-
ductivity improvements [24].
However it is evident from this study that the payment
models used by most Australian private health insurers
represent relatively unsophisticated approaches to pur-
chasing. In addition to most insurers not using DRG case
payments, innovation in developing new purchasing
models beyond casemix was largely concentrated in one
major insurer, BUPA Australia. The culture of conserva-
tism seemed to limit the willingness of some insurers to
engage in learning through implementation of payment
model reforms. In 1997 a BUPA Australia representative
argued in relation to the development of new funding
models for rehabilitation services that:
"The expectation is that we will learn as we proceed. We are
unlikely to learn as much by standing still." [18]
In 2004 this spirit of learning, including learning through
making mistakes, did not appear to be a strongly defining
characteristic of many private health insurers.
Another interpretation of the findings of this study is that
health insurers view their purchasing role as having toAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:6 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/6
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balance competing objectives, only one of which is about
improvements in technical efficiency. Insured consumers
may consider that 'best value' incorporates access to a
wide range of hospital services at the time of their choos-
ing, assurances about the quality and safety of health serv-
ices, and no intervention by their insurer to limit health
service choices made by the patient or their doctor. As
reported earlier in this paper, health insurers frequently
referred to the challenges of maintaining the value propo-
sition of health insurance. More specifically, the use of
consumer co-payments, selective contracting of private
hospitals and volume-outcome purchasing were viewed
by some insurers as potentially reducing the value of pri-
vate health insurance.
Relationship between regulation and purchasing
This study highlighted some of the frustrations experi-
enced by insurers in moving to a more proactive purchas-
ing role, encapsulated in the complaint about "legislation
that actually prevents you from doing a good job of pur-
chasing". Examples of regulation viewed as problematic
by insurers included the requirement that insurers pay
second-tier default benefits to non-contracted hospitals,
cumbersome approval processes for purchasing outreach
services and the impact of reinsurance in inhibiting sub-
stitution between hospital and community-based
services.
However, it is not uncommon for industry generally to
use regulation as a convenient scapegoat to justify public
concerns about its performance. If regulation were really a
significant barrier to improved purchasing behavior by
private health insurers, it would be expected that it would
impact equally on all health insurance companies.
Instead, Australian health insurers exposed to an identical
regulatory environment have developed very different
approaches to purchasing health services for their mem-
bers. The innovative purchasing models used by BUPA
were developed despite the negative impacts through rein-
surance arrangements for BUPA of some of these models.
While it is clearly desirable for regulation to promote
effectiveness and efficiency in purchasing so that insured
people get 'the best care for the best price', the regulatory
environment is not the only factor influencing purchasing
behavior. In particular, regulation cannot trump institu-
tional history and culture, nor can it create savvy, entre-
preneurial insurers that are skilful in parlaying
relationships with health service providers into best value
health care for their members.
The relationship between regulation and effective pur-
chasing is complex. Most commentators in the health
arena recognize the need for a significant role for govern-
ment in regulating health markets due to well accepted
market failures such as information asymmetry, external-
ities and the potential for supplier induced demand [25].
It has previously been noted that the National Health Act
1953  lacks clear and coherent policy objectives that
explain the purpose of government regulation of this
industry. The theoretical rationale for government inter-
vention can include promoting consumer access to afford-
able and attractive products, improving accountability to
consumers, encouraging competition and efficiency in the
private health sector, and promoting the financial sustain-
ability of the sector [26]. Insurers noted the tension in bal-
ancing some of these objectives, including the trade-off
between broad choice of providers and services, low co-
payments and affordable health insurance premiums.
While the first priority must be greater clarity about the
policy objectives behind private health insurance regula-
tion, the regulatory framework for purchasing could also
be improved. The approval process for outreach services is
an example of a detailed command-and-control approach
to regulation that would no longer be regarded as best
practice [27]. A preferred approach to private health insur-
ance regulation generally would be greater adoption of
performance-based regulation. This would clearly specify
the desired outcomes but allow private health insurers the
opportunity to be flexible and innovative in how they
achieve these outcomes [28].
Conclusion
Since the passage of the 1995 legislation allowing health
insurers to take a more pro-active role in purchasing,
health insurers have sought to balance the competing
demands of private hospitals, medical professionals, con-
sumers and government. While health insurers see the
relationship with private hospitals as symbiotic, some
have concerns about the potential for unnecessary medi-
cal servicing and the lack of transparency on private hos-
pital costs. There are also mixed views about the merits of
pursuing a more aggressive policy on selective contracting
of private hospitals, notwithstanding that competitive
tendering has allowed two major insurers to implement
more sophisticated payment models. Progress towards
greater adoption of case payments using DRGs has been
much slower than anticipated. Industry conservatism and
resistance to change, coupled with inadequate investment
in hospital cost analysis, may have contributed to this sit-
uation. However, the foreshadowed move by two other
major insurers to base their purchasing strategies on
DRGs, together with the growing demand from private
hospitals for uniformity in payment models, may finally
swing the pendulum towards more effective purchasing of
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